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Clinical Legal Education: A Student Perspective 
Michael Cozens* 
Fiscal restraint has forced many law schools to reconsider funding clinical education 
programs. Using the Dalhousie Legal Aid Service (DLAS) as an example, the 
educational effectiveness of clinical legal education is examined. Clinical education 
provides a context in which students can learn and apply the traditional law school 
curriculum. There is a danger, however, that clinical education will focus on technical 
skills without honing analytical skills such as ends-means analysis. The supervisor plays 
a crucial role in structuring the clinical experience into an educational one, from which 
students develop approaches to solving legal problems in practice. If the pitfalls are 
avoided, clinical education can be invaluable to the student and can enhance traditional 
programs. Although there are weaknesses in DLAS's program, its educational value 
warrants its continued existence. 
La contrainte fiscale a impose a de nombreuses facultes de droit une reconsideration de 
la question des fonds donnes au programme d'education clinique. En se servant de 
l'exemple de "Dalhousie Legal Aid Service" (DLAS), l'efficacite pedagogique de 
!'education clinique legate est examinee. L'education clinique procure aux etudiants un 
contexte ou ifs peuvent apprendre et appliquer le curriculum scolaire traditionnel en 
droit. ll existe, toutefois, un danger que !'education clinique se concentre sur des 
aptitudes techniques sans aiguiser les aptitudes analytiques telle !'analyse "fins et 
moyens". Le surveillant joue un role crucial, a savoir, structurer !'experience clinique 
pour qu'elle soit une experience educative, d'ou les etudiants developpent des approches 
a la resolution de problemes legaux a travers la pratique. Si Les pieges sont evites, 
l 'education clinique peut fournir des avantages inestimables pour l' etudiant, et peut 
meme rehausser des programmes traditionnels. Bien que le programme DLAS ait des 
points faibles, sa valeur pedagogique justifie sa continuation. 
On January 31, 1991 the immediate future of Dalhousie Legal Aid Service 
(DLAS) was decided in a vote by Faculty Council. The current economic 
position of Dalhousie Law School, as well as Dalhousie University itself, had 
forced many programs to be eliminated or cut back. Faced with either the option 
of closing DLAS entirely or allowing it to continue to function essentially 
unchanged for three more years, Faculty Council voted for the latter. The vote 
* Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. 1992. 
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was not an overwhelming show of support for DLAS, however. The debate was 
emotional, and polarized both faculty and students into three camps: one for 
continuation of DLAS, one against, and a third group who simply felt that they 
did not understand the real issues involved well enough to take a position. The 
result is that the future of DLAS still hangs in the balance; an overall Senate 
Review of Dalhousie Law School, including a critical look at DLAS was 
recently completed, with recommendations released in August 1992. The 
Review Committee recommended that the Law School significantly reduce its 
financial contribution to DLAS and consider a merger with other legal aid 
providers in Nova Scotia. 1 
During the "great debate," I was one of the students who was not sure which 
was the best solution. I had already decided to register in DLAS and ultimately 
completed a summer term there in August 1991. It was my feeling, however, 
that the clinical debate had been somewhat "skewed." Many of the real issues 
were shoved to the sidelines by both sides during the dispute.2 Those opposed to 
the continuance of the DLAS perceived its value primarily as a social program 
for the community with a secondary benefit to the students. Many of those in 
favour of its continuance spoke of the exceptional experience they had at DLAS 
and emphasized the "liberal" social consciousness component of DLAS's 
mandate.3 
To me, the ultimate issue was the educational value of a clinical course to 
the student body as a whole. This was based on my belief that the bottom line in 
any program offered by the law school should be its educational value; the social 
or practical value had to be measured in terms of education provided. Was the 
expense of operating DLAS justifiable from an academic perspective, or would 
the student body be better served by funds being diverted to other areas such as 
the hiring of more faculty and the introduction of additional courses? The 
academic value of DLAS to the law school remained largely undefined, 
however, and thus was not the focal point of the debate as it should have been. 
The reason for this was that few people were aware of the educational 
1 Senate Review of the Faculty of law, Final Report (Dalhousie University, 1992) at 11 
[unpublished]. 
2 Condlin's comments describe quite accurately the atmosphere which surrounded the 
law school during this time: "Convincing our schools to offer clinical courses is seen as 
roughly akin to winning elections. We organize constituencies, lobby undecided voters, 
and seek out economic and political leverage. It is no wonder that we have sometimes 
been described as anti-intellectual." R.J. Condlin, "Clinical Education in the Seventies: 
An Appraisal of the Decade" (1983) 33 J. Legal Educ. 604 at 609. 
3 Lorenne Clark, the DLAS Director at this time, expressed the DLAS mandate as 
threefold: first, to provide legal services to the poor; second, to provide students with 
practical experience; and third, to act towards community development and law reform. 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 203 
philosophy of clinical education and resorted to other arguments with which 
they felt most comfortable, either practical, social, or personal. 
By considering the educational nature of the experience offered, I will 
attempt to define the value of clinical legal education in general. This evaluation 
will assist in assessing the worth of DLAS to Dalhousie Law School in 
particular. It is not my intent, however, to do a technical analysis of DLAS 
within the overall law school structure. My focus is the philosophy of clinical 
methodology as an educational tool. Until this is understood, any attempt to 
determine DLAS's value to the law school's educational program is futile. 
Much has already been written about clinical education, albeit mostly from 
an American perspective.4 There is little value, therefore, in repeating it. 
Having spent a term at DLAS, however, there is much I want to say as a student, 
about what is being posited by the clinical theorists concerning the nature and 
function of clinical education. The theory of clinical legal education and the 
actual practice of it must be brought face-to-face to see if they are reconcilable. 
In today's difficult economic times, clinical programs will be eliminated or 
downsized unless it is clearly proven that they provide the student with an 
adequate legal education, and are effective in doing so. This is the practical 
reality of legal education and, in fact, of most education today. If clinical 
programs are seen to be necessary, then law schools will have to find ways to 
incorporate them into their curricula or they cannot say that they are providing 
students with a fulfilling legal education. 
In short, I am asking what clinical education is, whether we need it, and 
whether we are providing it at Dalhousie Law School. It is in this context that 
the future of DLAS, as well as other clinical programs at the law school, is 
considered. 
WHAT IS WRONG WITH LEGAL EDUCATION? 
In order to determine if legal education is seriously flawed it is first necessary to 
4 It is important to recognize the differences between the United States and Canadian Bar 
admission systems at the outset. In the U.S. the law schools and Bar requirements vary 
from state to state. Often, students go straight from law school to a difficult set of Bar 
examinations and then into practice, while in the more uniform Canadian system, students 
leave law school to enter an articling period of one year with less difficult (at this time, 
although this is also changing) Bar examinations incorporated into their time as articling 
students. Many of the U.S. concerns about turning students essentially untrained in 
technical and practical skills directly into practice are not as applicable in Canada. 
However, the philosophical tenets of clinical legal education are transferable to a study of 
the legal education which the Canadian student is receiving. In Canada, the central 
questions are: (1) what is the aim of clinical education; and, (2) is such an experience 
lacking in a student's articling period? 
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have an image of what a legal education is supposed to be; it can then be 
determined whether the law schools' curricula achieve these predetermined 
objectives. What then is the consensus within law schools as to what a legal 
education should be and should do? Here we see the first signs of a problem: 
legal educators cannot reach an agreement on this fundamental question. 
Legal educational theorists are either in the camp of those who believe that 
legal education's primary purpose is to train students to be practitioners or of 
those who believe that its purpose is to cause students to question the theoretical 
and philosophical underpinnings of the law as we presently understand it. 
Barnhizer puts it this way: "After more than one hundred and fifty years of 
existence, American law schools are still caught astride a chasm that separates 
the Scylla of the academic university from the Charybdis of the practicing 
profession."5 Stranded in this chasm are the students who are unsure of what to 
make of the situation and settle quickly into disillusionment. Generally, students 
come to law school with a degree of anticipation. They are excited about being 
there and have a desire to learn and study law as a discipline. First-year students 
are "fired up." By third year they just want out, not so much because they are 
looking forward to the articling phase of their experience but because they are 
bored and frustrated with the educational phase. 
A major factor contributing to this student alienation and apathy is the lack 
of leadership from the law school. This is because the law school itself is unsure 
of its direction. Klare claims that: 
Law school education does not, by and large, train students 
either to practice law or to engage in serious legal scholarship. 
Rather, the law-school curriculum disenfranchises students 
intellectually and disables and incapacitates them 
professionally.6 
This is because the primary function of law schooling is to prepare and 
socialize students to enter into a very narrow range of careers. He also has three 
additional claims in this regard. First, law schools generally ignore the training 
for the practice of law, assuming that this will occur when the student is actually 
practicing. Only a few large firms and government can provide this on-the-job 
training. If the poor receive first-rate legal services the law schools should 
receive little credit. Second, the students are disabled and socialized by the law 
schools: (a) systematically manufacturing a false consciousness; (b) dictating 
s D. Barnhizer, "The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education" (1990) 35 
N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 87 at 92. 
6 K.E. Klare, "The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?" (1982) 32 J. 
Legal Educ. 336 at 337. 
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what social and moral attitudes are acceptable; and, (c) ignoring the necessary 
technical. intellectual and interpersonal capacities which are needed. Third, the 
curriculum is designed to protect the interests of and legitimize the power of law 
teachers.7 He is right. As students, we emerge from law school without being 
challenged intellectually, without having to learn how to think creatively or 
constructively, and we feel robbed because when we entered law school we were 
looking forward to these challenges. We also leave without a solid foundation in 
the practical skills necessary for good lawyering and enter practice still carrying 
many of the fears which we had when we entered law school.8 As Barnhizer 
says, it is perhaps the worst deficiency of law schools, that they " ... fail on both 
ends, dealing neither with the deep metaphysical and structural substances of the 
law, nor with the applicational aspects of law and lawyering."9 Unsure of what 
to give students, law schools give them very little at all. 
It is no wonder, therefore, that students give little back to their educational 
experience. Acting Dean Philip Girard at Dalhousie Law School commented 
that he would like to "abolish third-year syndrome" saying that "If I could, I 
would mandate a year off for all students between third year and articles. I 
realize that having a job sewn up is very comforting but it certainly affects one's 
interest in law school."IO There is no doubt that most third year students are not 
interested in law school. Their lack of interest is not because they have jobs to 
go to, however, but because there is very little in law school to interest them. 11 
Third-year attrition 12 does not happen because most students are lazy; it happens 
7 Ibid. at 337-338. 
8 "For most recent graduates, the first year of practice traditionally is a crash course in 
everything they didn't learn in law school: writing and communication skills, creative 
problem solving, giving advice and law practice management." "The Making of a 
Professional" (1990) 76 A.B.A. J. 43 (1990) in J.T. Younger, "Legal Education: An 
Illusion" (1991) 75 Minnesota Law Review 1037 at 1038. See also F.W. Munger, 
"Clinical Legal Education: The Case Against Separatism" 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 715 
(1980) at 723-726. Keep in mind the differences between the Canadian and American 
systems. The Canadian articling period allows for some of these practical skills to be 
acquired. Lost, however, is the academic environment within which these practical skills 
may be scrutinized for larger purposes than the task at hand. 
9 Supra note 5at115-116. 
10 Weldon Times, Vol. 15, No. 7 (April 1992) at 6. 
11 The only students I was aware of who were looking forward to their third year were 
those who were doing a term at DLAS or in the Criminal Clinic. All the rest were simply 
looking forward to finishing. 
12 This attrition is documented. See "Law Schools and Professional Education: Report 
and Recommendations of the Special Committee for a Study of Legal Education of the 
American Bar Association" (1980) at 38-39. In M.A. McDiarmid, "What's Going On 
Down There in the Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead" (1990) 35 
N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 239 at 287. See also Committee on Educ. Planning and Dev. of 
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because students see the law school curriculum as not being relevant to their 
present or future interests. Law school becomes a hoop to jump through before 
one can get on with one's life. Rebecca Veinot, a former Dalhousie Law School 
student, pointed to certain factors such as mastery of the skill required to write 
law school exams, 13 the motivational depressant of the Bell curve, the irrational 
relationship between effort expended and the resultant marks, and the tension in 
the student-teacher relationship 14 [particularly in Socratic style classes] as some 
Harvard Univ. School of Law, Interim Report 17 (1980): 
A student's last semesters in law school are disorganized, ill-
designed, monotonous, passive, repetitive, de-energizing, 
dissatisfying and apathy producing. It has been said that particularly 
in that third year there is little value in classroom activity, an overall 
formlessness in the curriculum, a paucity of informative comment or 
feedback on student progress, a restricted and unhelpful method of 
evaluation of students, and deeply troubling negative aspects of 
faculty-student relations. 
Quoted in M. Stickgold, "Exploring the Invisible Curriculum: Clinical Field Work in 
American Law Schools" (1989) 19 New Mex. L. Rev. 287. 
13 The examination structure serves to motivate students to learn how to write exams and 
actually discourages them from attempting to do all their assigned class readings. One of 
the most valuable lessons students learn in law school is that you often receive better 
marks if you do no more than is necessary. I, as did many others, virtually stopped doing 
any of my casebook readings for any of my classroom courses. I simply borrowed sets of 
"cans" (condensed annotated notes) from former students (preferably on disk) and 
reorganized them, supplementing them with my class notes. From these I wrote my 
examinations and received good marks. The better I learned how to utilize this method, 
the better my marks got. Meanwhile students who read everything often received lower 
marks for their efforts. Is this only an indication that I, and these others·, are lazy 
students? If so, then it is the system which has made us lazy by not making us 
accountable, because when we first started law school we read everything. It only took 
us to first year Christmas exams to realize that this was not only unnecessary but also 
counterproductive. 
14 Bellow states that: 
We still do not have any explicit criteria of good teaching (although 
we purportedly know it when we see it or know when we don't), any 
adequate measure of teacher effectiveness, or any agreement on the 
purposes of legal education which can be expressed in terms of 
explicit contents or observable learning outcomes. 
G. Bellow, "On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical 
Education as Methodology" in Clinical Education for the Law Student (New York: 
Meilen Press, 1973) 374. Younger comments that "before we loose any [teachers] on 
students, in addition to natural gifts, we should insist on demonstrated ability in both 
learning and using the law." Younger, supra note 8 at 1041. See also J. Frank, "Why 
Not a Clinical Lawyer School?" (1933) Vol. 81 No. 8 Univ. of L. Rev. 907 at 915. 
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of the causes of declining student interest and involvement in law schooJ.15 
These curricular weaknesses are part of the problem, but there is another 
more deeply rooted defect. Students are still being taught the law outside the 
contexts necessary to understand, interpret, and apply the law. Amsterdam 
states that: 
Legal education in those days [late 20th century] was too 
narrow because it failed to develop in students ways of 
thinking within and about the role of lawyers - methods of 
critical analysis, planning, and decision-making which are not 
themselves practical skills but rather the conceptual 
foundations for practical skills and for much else, just as case 
reading and doctrinal analysis are foundations for practical 
skills and for much else. 16 
To isolate the law and attempt to teach it to students without situating the 
students within the law is to doom such effort to failure. The law is a massive 
structure comprised of many interrelated parts, of which the student is one, and 
the law school environment should give recognition to as many of these as 
possible. Unfortunately, in law school they all too often " ... eschew the place of 
personal values and feelings in favor of dispassionate, sometimes calculated 
amorality. Neither the law nor the people it serves are amoral or value free." 17 
In today's informed and troubled society students are aware that life is 
complicated. A curriculum which does not reflect this indeterminate nature of 
society leaves students feeling that what they are doing is not relevant to "real" 
life. Hence they are less motivated to engage themselves in the process. 
As a result, students become alienated from many of the values which they 
possess; they suppress their instinctive reactions and fail to question whether the 
legal system is just, instead learning to accept the legal hierarchy as being the 
proper "lawyer-like" way to think. 18 "Justice" becomes a forgotten word as the 
student is conditioned to think in the proper way. 19 Klare is more blunt: 
From this powerful set of symbolic messages law students 
learn that the only lawyer-like way to view the world is 
15 R. Veinott, "Clinical Legal Education: The Implementation and Success of Theoretical 
Models at Dalhousie University Law School" (1990) Unpublished paper for DLAS. 
16 A.G. Amsterdam, "Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Perspective" (1984) 34 
J. Legal Educ. 612. 
17 N. Gold, "Legal Education, Law and Justice: The Clinical Experience" (1979) 44 
Sask. L. Rev. 97 at 108. 
18 Klare, supra note 6 at 341. 
19 "[J]ustice as a criteria for decision is often dismissed in the first three days of classes 
as soft-headed and unrealistic." G. Bellow, "On Talking Tough to Each Other: Comments 
on Condlin" (1983) J. of Lega!Educ. 619. 
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moderately, through the window of moderate conservatism or 
liberal reformism ... the only lawyer-like way to think about 
social change is in terms of atomized, marginal, incremental 
reform through governmental regulation of private 
conduct... [and] they learn that lawyers do not possess 
intellectual skills and preoccupations appropriate to discussion 
and analysis of fundamental issues of social and political 
organization and thoroughgoing social change.20 
If this is what is required in order for one to "think like a lawyer", many students 
don't want it. Their interest in learning the law diminishes, their motivation 
disappears and they quickly become bored with the entire process. Most 
students come to law school with something to say. First-year classes are often 
hotbeds of discussion on any number of topics. It doesn't take long, however, 
for them to figure out that few people, in particular the law school hierarchy, 
care about what they have to say. By the time they reach third year they have 
stopped talking. They may not have accepted the narrow vision of the law 
school curriculum, but they have learned how to survive within it. 
If law schools were to incorporate into their curricula and methodology the 
findings and practices of other fields of study, as some have suggested,21 the 
initial level of student interest and motivation would have a better likelihood of 
surviving. Sociological, psychological and anthropological concepts could 
provide a context for the determination and application of justice. This would 
open the door to what Barnhizer calls the critical element of " ... principled 
inquiry into conditions of justice and injustice as actually manifested in real 
societal arrangements."22 
Acknowledging the context in which the principles of law are practiced and 
experienced would require that law schools take a critical look at their own 
failures and weaknesses and move to rectify them.23 The Harvard Law School 
Committee considered that legal education had a responsibility to society which 
included the recognition that society's problems are legal in nature.24 In order to 
20 Supra note 6 at 339. 
21 Supra note 14 at 334-335. 
22 Supra note 5 at 123. 
23 Bellow, supra note 19 at 622. 
24 (Report of the Committee on Educational Planning and Development, Harvard Law 
School 3 (Tent. Final Draft Apr. 21, 1982), in B.Q. Clemmons, "Updating Legal 
Education: A Proposed Curriculum Emphasizing Clinical Education" (1989-90) 12 
George Mason Univ. L. Rev. 57 at 63: 
The Harvard Law School Committee ... presented a threefold objective 
of legal education .... First, legal education is undertaken for the sake 
of future clients ... Second, legal education is undertaken for the sake 
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ameliorate societal conditions it is necessary that they be identified. To effect 
this, legal education must become involved in the human underpinnings and 
machinations of society. 25 New methods of teaching and new areas of 
instruction need to be developed because society is ever changing and 
unpredictable. Creative educational ideas are needed to challenge the 
ossification and inertia which tend to cause intellectual developments to stagnate 
before their potential is realized. 26 
It is here that clinical theorists enter into the picture, claiming that clinical 
legal education can alleviate many of the shortfalls mentioned above. Barnhizer 
points out that clinical faculty operate according to a set of themes based on 
integrating larger societal concerns into the students' educational experience. 
This is achieved through the practical concept of justice in action and through 
creating a sense of responsibility within the student. 27 The end result, according 
of society. Here is a recognition that legal education does not take 
place in a vacuum, but must address society's problems and view 
them as legal in nature ... Third, legal education is undertaken for the 
sake of the students ... We must arouse students' intellectual curiosity 
and assist in the development of important personal and professional 
goals. 
25 Gold, supra note 17 at 121: 
The letter of the law is in practice rarely singularly honored or 
applicable without reference to essentially non-legal, but extremely 
relevant attitudes, actions and perceptions. On a fundamental level 
law cannot be predicted and the meandering of legal processes cannot 
be prophesied without reference to the human factor. In its operation, 
the law is not a restatement or working out of positive rules. 
26 C. Axelrod, Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough 2,3 (1979). In Barnhizer, supra note 
5 at 98-99. 
27 Supra note 5 at 123. And, at 89-90: 
The primary themes that have characterized the work of clinical 
faculty include: 
(I) the importance of developing and implementing practical 
conceptions of justice; 
(2) seeking to develop new forms of knowledge, particularly those 
relevant to basic law practice; 
(3) challenging the extreme formalization and professed neutrality of 
traditional legal education; 
(4) providing legal services to disadvantaged groups, and instilling in 
law students a desire to help the disadvantaged throughout their 
professional careers; 
(5) a desire to teach law students the practical skills of law practice; 
(6) an interest in teaching professional and/or moral values to law 
students; 
(7) the responsibility of law faculty to challenge courts, legislatures, 
210 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
to these theorists, is that the basic core of knowledge by which law schools 
operate is extended and transformed through the clinical experience.2s The 
positive attributes of clinical legal education therefore have a ripple effect which 
elevates the entire law school educational experience for all students. These are 
powerful claims and, if true, cannot be ignored. After a brief look at the 
historical emergence of clinical legal education, I consider the validity of these 
claims. 
THE HISTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
The presence of clinical legal education programs in most Canadian and 
American law schools is a result of a radical shift in the late 1960s and early 
1970s within the legal educational structure. The coming of age of the baby 
boomers, the Vietnam War, and the general societal upheaval, along with other 
factors, created a society fermenting with dissatisfaction. The relevance of law 
schools was questioned because they were seen to be ignoring the needs of the 
poor within society, and ineffectual at equipping law students for practice.29 The 
administrative agencies, and political executives concerning actions 
that appear unjust; 
(8) a desire to socially "engineer" American society, primarily to 
reflect the liberal political vision of a just society; 
(9) a wish on the part of many clinical faculty to combine the practice 
of law with academic reflectiveness; and 
(I 0) an interest in researching and/or litigating specific areas of 
political/legal conflict. 
Identifying a specific set of themes that has been pursued by clinical 
faculty is, therefore, not intended to suggest that they invented them, 
but simply that clinical faculty represented a crudely coherent critical 
mass that shifted interest from what was at the time an individualized 
idiosyncratic context to a larger-scale political and programmatic 
focus. 
28 Ibid. at 98. 
29 M. Spiegal, "Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Legal 
Education" (1987) 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 577 at 605. 
[T]here was some need, perceived by people during the I 960's to try 
to create a new vehicle of education that would be sensitive to what 
some have called "humanism" that is, putting the person back into the 
center. What was envisioned was that learning can be a vital 
experience involving what we learn about ourselves individually, 
what we learn about our role as attorneys, what we translate from that 
back into the legal curriculum, what content that puts back into 
course structures, and the materials that we work from. 
D.R. Bamhizer, "Remarks on Teaching and Testing Clinical Skills," in F.N. Dutile, ed., 
Legal Education and Lawyer Competency: Curricula for Change (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 33,34. In Veinott, supra note 15 at 7. 
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goal of the revisionists was to "bring the world back into the classroom, so that 
law schools had to deal with it, discuss it, confront its realities."30 The legal 
profession was not considered to be professionally responsible, and the cry went 
out for change. 
The thinking of the time was that professional responsibility should extend 
beyond the individual lawyer-client relationship and require the profession as a 
whole to ensure that legal services were provided to all those who needed them. 
Students, with their evident social concerns, were seen as a valuable source of 
manpower able to assist the legal profession in achieving an acceptable standard 
of professional responsibility. 31 The emergence of the Council on Legal 
Education for Professional Responsibility (C.L.E.P.R.)32 provided the clinical 
theorists with the financial support necessary to begin developing clinical 
programs in some law schools. 
The primary obstacle that faced the clinical theorists was the traditional 
entrenchment of the Langdellian casebook method in the law schools. Professor 
Langde11 33 believed that the study of law should be a scientific study, conducted 
on a theoretical basis to find the underlying principles that the student was 
required to learn. He developed the casebook method because it was akin to the 
scientific method.34 To this end he opposed the use of practitioners as teachers, 
feeling that their interaction with the legal system would cause them to have a 
narrow vision of the academic pursuit of the study of law. Pure academics 
would be able to present the philosophical concepts of law, untainted by the 
apparent realities of practice. Professors using Langdell's casebook method 
used the Socratic method of analytic study35 to create a dialogue between the 
30 Supra note 19 at 622. 
31 G.S. Grossman, "Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis" (1974) 26 J. Legal 
Educ. 162 at 173. 
32 (C.L.E.P.R. substantially funded the American clinical legal education movement until 
its demise in 1980.) See M.J. Kotkin, "Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical 
Education" (1989) I 9 New Mex. L. Rev. 185 at 189-193. The view at this time was that 
clinical legal education would reform legal education and encourage the development of 
professional responsibility. J.A. Barrette, "Content in Context: A Process of Clinical 
Teaching and Learning" (1987) 14 Ohio Northern Univ. L. Rev. 45 at 51. 
33 Appointed Dean of Harvard Law School in 1870. 
34 Spiegal, supra note 29 at 581-583. 
35 The focus of this style of teaching is on skills and methods of analysis as opposed to 
lecturing and rote memorization of material. Supra note 15 at 3. The Socratic method is 
in decline; lectures with voluntary response now seem to be the norm. As the classes are 
generally large, there are only a limited number of students who take up this challenge, 
and these tend to be the same students in each class. The result is that the majority of 
students are not brought into the type of analytical educational experience that is 
supposed to be the goal of the casebook teaching methodology. In essence then, law 
schools are utilizing the Langdellian casebook methodology of teaching law but without 
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student and professor that was designed to get at the underlying reasoning and 
principles of the law as contained in the casebook selections.36 
Langdell's principles have come under considerable attack from many legal 
educational theorists. From a purely practical perspective, less than one percent 
of legal matters end up in appellate courts. Therefore, most lawyers do not use 
the type of reasoned argumentation that they learn through the casebook 
methodology .37 Frank pointed to the lack of a context reflecting the 
unpredictable fluctuations of social interaction in Langdell's casebook method, 
citing Langdell's almost total lack of exposure to the complexities of actual 
practice. 38 He states that: 
Where the Langdell system is most seriously at fault is in its 
naive assumption of the inviolability of the stare decisis 
doctrine and its corollaries, in its implied belief that in a study 
of the precedents and nowhere else is to be found the answer 
to the question, "How does a court arrive at its decisions?"39 
While Langdell's theory of law as a science with predictable and empirically 
measurable infrastructures has been repudiated, his methodology has survived in 
a different form. No longer are the principles of the law rooted out through an 
examination of experimental case data; instead, students are taught to think like 
lawyers. 40 Gold has summed up the nature of traditional legal education as 
follows: 
[T]raditional legal education (1) pursues the learning of legal 
facts, (2) through a process of analysis, (3) which teaches 
students to think like lawyers, (4) then asks questions about 
underlying, fundamental principles, (5) and about policies. 
Almost all of this study engages the rational mind in an 
essentially objective analysis. 41 
It was this objective nature of legal education, with its accompanying aloofness 
from the human dynamics of society, which gave impetus to the cries for 
one of the foundational pillars. 
36 Supra note 31 at 163. 
37 McDiarmid, supra note 12 at 239. 
38 Frank, supra note 14 at 908. 
39 Ibid. at 912. Frank further asks, at 913: 
But is it not plain that, without giving up entirely the case-book 
system or the growing and valuable alliance with the co-called social 
sciences, the law schools should once more get in intimate contact 
with what clients need and with what courts and lawyers actually do? 
40 Spiegal, supra note 29 at 582. 
41 Supra note 17 at 107. 
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change.42 Realist theorists arose advocating that students had to be taught to 
look beyond the technical structures of judicial opinion to the "social and 
psychological forces which were at play upon the judge as an individual, and 
upon the institutional and professional system at the time of the opinion."43 
Besides a comprehension of the social setting, students also needed to be trained 
by exposure to practice.44 This exposure would let them see the "law in action" 
and create in them a sensitivity to the actual impact of the law upon society and 
society upon the law, as well as an awareness of their role within this larger 
scheme oflegal endeavor.45 The end result of Realist theory was to make law an 
"applied science based on practical considerations" as opposed to "an inductive 
science based on the case method."46 
Realist theory was marginalized by the traditionalists until the upheaval in 
the late 1960s that opened the educational doors to new ideas. Given the 
opportunity to implement their ideas, clinical theorists were quick to respond. 
The result was to bring about, in Klare's words, "[t]he only truly seismic change 
in modern curriculum."47 These early clinicians were largely drawn from 
practice48 and "conceived of themselves as public interest advocates acting on 
behalf of minorities and other disadvantaged groups in American society."49 
This emphasis on social issues, coupled with the rejection of the distinction 
between legal and social issues,50 gave the early clinical movement a political 
dimension. Unfortunately this political momentum did not foster academic or 
intellectual discipline, as Barnhizer states: 
Clinical faculty had impact because they were part of a more 
or less focused political movement. As children of the civil 
rights movement and anti-war efforts of the 1960's, however, 
the first generation of clinical faculty shared a naive and 
superficial vision of justice that often rejected "intellectual 
elitism." As a result of their values, experience, and 
background, clinical faculty were largely unwilling, and, in a 
42 "The Langdell model of a graduate program in pure law taught by the case method 
insulated the law professorate from the rest of the academic community, justified its 
professional role, and, very important at the time, neatly tied in with nativist and class 
prejudice." Klare, supra note 6 at 342. 
43 Grossman, supra note 31 at 167. 
44 Ibid. at 168. 
45 Ibid. at 171. 
46 Spiegal, supra note 29 at 589 quoting C. Woodard. 
47 Supra note 6 at 342. 
48 This distinction between clinical faculty and traditional faculty has given rise to 
numerous difficulties, some of which will be discussed later in this paper. 
49 Barnhizer, supra note 5 at 106. 
50 Ibid. at 109. 
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few instances, unable to compete on an intellectual as opposed 
to a visionary level. Because of these factors, the clinical 
movement was increasingly overtaken, and then surpassed, by 
more intellectually driven movements, themselves propelled 
by political visions, in which there was a better understanding 
of the use of intellectual arguments as strategic weapons.51 
The result was to prevent the clinical movement from becoming entrenched in 
the law school curriculum on an equal basis academically and intellectually 
with the traditional curriculum. Non-clinical faculty, having lost the struggle to 
keep clinical education out of the schools, now turned their energy to keeping it 
from being recognized as having any significant academic value.52 Stickgold 
points to two grounds of opposition to clinical programs: first, there was the 
elitist "ivory tower" view that devalued any experientially-based learning that 
took place outside of the traditional classroom; second, there was the often valid 
argument that there were serious deficiencies in the academic structuring of 
these programs.53 The failure to develop a solid pedagogy for clinical legal 
education ultimately has had the effect of leaving the movement without a well 
developed root structure. Most clinical programs are not necessarily threatened 
with complete eradication from the curriculum;54 they are, however, threatened 
with either a restructuring, which will eliminate the more expensive live-client 
in-house clinics, such as DLAS, or an ideological shift in the clinical 
methodology. Such a shift will relegate clinical programs to a "controllable" 
secondary status within the law school hierarchy. 
51 Ibid. at 107. 
52 In large part this was to protect their own position of power within the law school 
hierarchy. The traditional curriculum was designed and maintained the way that it was 
(and still is to· some extent) because it justifies and entrenches the power of professors, 
and because it is what they do best. Klare, supra note 6 at 342. 
53 Stickgold, supra note 12 at 290-291. Meltsner stated that "So long as the critical role 
of practice-based learning is allowed to remain invisible and unplanned, the learning that 
comes out of this relationship will be ad hoc and capricious." M. Meltsner, "Healing the 
Breach: Harmonizing Legal Practice and Education," (1986) 11 Vt. L. Rev. 377 at 385. 
Much early clinical education was ad hoc learning due to the social service emphasis of 
the movement. Some clinicians actually thought that such learning was a sufficient 
academic educational experience. 
54 In the summer of 1987 the Clinical Section of the Association of American Law 
Schools sent a questionnaire to its member schools. This study was conducted over a 2.5 
year period. According to the author, the study indicates that the health of live-client, in-
house clinics is more robust than at any time since the inception of these programs. The 
study demonstrates a growth of in-house clinics in proportion to clinical offerings 
available, continued good student/faculty ratios, high student demand, increased 
pedagogical sophistication in law school clinics taught by law school employees, and an 
exposure of students to practicing with real clients. McDiarmid, supra note 12 at 241. 
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The modern clinical movement is now in the position of being assailed from 
three fronts: from without as the financial pressures upon universities are forcing 
law schools to take a serious look at cost-cutting measures; from other faculty 
who are still resisting the experiential-learning based clinical programs on the 
basis that they are insufficiently academic; and from within, as clinicians are 
struggling to develop a clinical methodology that will prevent clinical legal 
education from becoming just another "skills based" course in the curriculum. 
The next part of this paper will examine the goals of clinical methodology, its 
values and pitfalls, and whether these goals are in fact being realized in the 
clinical programs as offered. 
CLINICAL METHODOLOGY 
One of the major problems confronting clinical legal education is that it is not 
recognized as being a distinct methodology within a larger progressive scheme. 
There is a tendency to define it in terms of its goals instead of its pedagogical 
method.55 Non-clinical faculty tend to view clinical programs in terms of their 
technical skill$ benefit to the students.56 Students, both those who take clinical 
programs and those who do not, also focus on technical "preparation for 
practice" aspect, along with the social utility function, as being the reason for 
clinical legal education. Hence, the notion that clinics such as DLAS are only 
for those who comprise the "left-wing" social consciousness of the law school.57 
What is happening is that certain goals of clinical legal education are being 
used to define the content of this type of educational experience. By its nature, 
clinical legal education cannot be defined this way. Its "real-life context", 
"emphasis on roles", "world perspective that is egalitarian and reformist.. .and 
[its] concern with ethic" make it a part of the overall transition of both the 
55 Bellow, supra note 19 at p 624-625. 
56 See, e.g., C.Eliot, "Eliot on the Scientific Schools" in R. Hofstader & W. Smith, eds, 
American Higher Education: A Documentary History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961) at 624, 634-635. Cited in Barnhizer, supra note 5 at 92. 
57 The lack of student support for clinical programs such as DLAS stems in large part 
from this misconception. Business-oriented students, for example, argue that the funding 
which is directed at DLAS would be more equitably distributed throughout the school if it 
was instead used to hire additional professors to broaden the curriculum. Others tend to 
agree. If clinical legal education was understood in terms of its educational value as a 
methodology for educating students in legal concepts in the context of a real world, many 
of the bases for disagreement would be swept away. The values of a functional clinical 
pedagogy should extend to every area of the law school curriculum. That they do not, 
and are still generally considered to be limited to poverty law areas, is indicative of 
clinician's failure to structure a sound pedagogy or the non-clinicians refusal to listen, or 
both. 
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student and the entire legal system.58 While many of these goals are important, 
they are only a part of the larger goal of developing in students the capabilities 
to function effectively within the legal system and to change it where necessary. 
Clinical legal education attempts to bring a "holistic approach to the educational 
process."59 
Although it is fine to speak of clinical legal education as a method, it is 
fundamental that the precise purposes and goals of the method be articulated.60 
The basic features, according to Bellows, are: 
1) the student's assumption and performance of a recognized 
role within the legal system; 2) the teacher's reliance on this 
experience as the focal point for intellectual inquiry and 
reflection; and 3) a number of identifiable tensions which arise 
out of ordering the teaching-learning process in this way. 
What is envisioned is a mode of education which involves the 
systematic interaction of pedagogical technique and the 
psychological dynamics involved in role adjustment and 
definition.61 
Barnhizer adds to this by arguing that the clinical method has to integrate three 
factors: 
1. A substantial, but restricted, volume of actual client 
representation by the student. 
2. The clear assumption by that individual student of 
"primary" responsibility for the process and outcome of that 
representation. 
3. An individualized teaching relationship between the 
student and clinical teacher, using the student's clinical 
experiences as its focus.62 
The result is that the student functions in an active role with all of the basic 
responsibilities that accompany the role. This change from the previous passive 
classroom involvement provides a considerable motivational lift to the student. 
It also provides a whole new decision-making structure, bringing the student into 
a confrontational environment, not only with the other parties in the process, but 
also with him or herself. This "stirring of the dust" creates a "charged" 
atmosphere of kinetic tension. What makes the clinical experience educational, 
58 LaFrance, A.B., "Clinical Education and the Year 2010" (1987) 37 J. Legal Educ. 352 
at 362. 
59 Veinott, supra note 15 at 8. 
60 Bellow, supra note 14 at 378. 
61 Ibid. at 379. 
62 D. Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and 
Implementation" (1979-80) J. Legal Educ. 67 at 72-73. 
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however, is the dynamic of the student-teacher relationship as it is structured 
around this tension. Whether the clinical experience of the student is 
transformed into an enduring educational experience depends on the 
effectiveness of the teacher in exploiting the learning opportunities created by 
the clinical methodology.63 
Amsterdam points to the kinds of questions which students should be asking 
and encouraged to reflect upon with supervisory input: 
What were my objectives in that performance? How did I 
define them? Might I have defined them differently? Why did 
I define them as I did? What were the means available to me to 
achieve my objectives? Did I consider the full range of them? 
If not, why not? What modes of thinking would have 
broadened my options? How did I expect other people to 
behave? How did they behave?· Might I have anticipated their 
behavior - their goals,their needs, their expectations, their 
reactions to me - more accurately than I did? What clues to 
these things did I overlook, and why did I overlook them? 
Through what kind of thinking, analysis, planning, 
perceptivity, might I see them better next time?64 
What clinicians are trying to teach students is a way of thinking, a way of 
problem-solving and decision-making, in a context which most closely parallels 
the environment in which the student will have to act once in practice. It is not 
so much the right answer that is being taught, as it is a methodology for 
determining the right or best answer when faced with a particular situation. 
Given the complexities which lawyers in practice face, it is more practical to be 
able to know how to find an answer than to attempt to know all the answers.65 
Amsterdam states that "a major function of law schools is to give students 
systematic training in effective techniques for learning law from the experience 
of practicing law."66 A proper law school education should not be a "self-
63 Infra note 81 at 239. See also F.S. Bloch, "The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal 
Education" (1982) 35 Vand. L. Rev. 321at330-332. 
64 Supra note 16 at 617. 
65 See, e.g., Spiegal, supra note 29 at 600. 
66 Supra note 16 at 612-613. Also, see J. Motley, "Self-Directed Learning and the Out-
Of-House Placement" (1989) 19 New Mex. L. Rev. 211at219-220. See also Barrette, 
supra note 32 at 51-53: 
The purpose of legal education should be to train students to become 
effective problem solvers in the legal context. This requires effective 
learning - knowing how to learn from experience, to avoid repeating 
mistakes, and to improve performance with practice ... In other 
words, traditional legal education's goal is teaching students how to 
learn and apply the law ... The primary purpose of clinical courses, 
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contained and terminal educational episode."67 If properly instructed in 
techniques for learning, the student's years in practice can be "a reflective, 
organized, systematic learning experience."68 Law schools must remember that 
they are training students for a professional career. 
The dynamic which is the catalyst for differentiating clinical legal education 
from other forms of legal education is the introduction of the live client. 69 Being 
responsible for the legal problems of a client makes the entire learning process 
relevant for the student. The motivational problems which are so apparent in 
upper year students do not exist for the clinical student. The student has a "need 
to learn." 
Not only do the client demands provide this incentive to the student, but 
also the s_imilarity of the clinical experience to the student's vision of future 
practice causes him or her to value success in the clinic. If a.student cannot cope 
with the demands of the clinic, there is a sense that he or she will not be able to 
handle practicing law after graduating. This contrasts greatly with how the 
students view the non-clinical course offerings. Because of the apparent lack of 
relevance of the traditional curriculum to what students perceive as being the 
practice of law, a weak performance in one of these courses is not viewed by the 
student as indicative of what he or she will be able to do in practice. 
Another tension created by the introduction of the live client is supervisory 
conflict. The needs of the client and the needs of the student are not always best 
met by the same course of action. Therefore, the supervisor is faced with the 
dilemma of educational responsibility versus responsibility to the client.70 How 
the supervisor resolves this conflict, the balancing of priorities and 
responsibilities, can be a valuable learning experience for the student, 
particularly in the area of teaching professional responsibility. One of the 
greatest fears that the student has is that they will handle a situation in an 
unprofessional manner to the detriment of the client and their own 
embarrassment. The supervisor stands as a role model for the student and has 
like substantive courses, is to develop students' ability to learn from 
their experience. 
67 Supra note 16 at 616. 
68 Ibid. 
69 It is acknowledged that not all of what is termed "clinical legal education" involves the 
use of live clients. An example is simulation exercises. However, despite the common 
labelling, I feel that the concept of clinical legal education in its purest form relies on the 
live client experience. This seems to be the perspective of most clinical theorists. 
70 There is more discussion on this point under the heading Intervention later in this 
paper. Bellows speaks of the tension which exists between the natural randomness of 
role enactment and the need for the supervisor to limit this spontaneity in the interests of 
protecting the clients and others. Bellow, supra note 14 at 391. 
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the ability through dialogue to influence the way that the student thinks about 
what constitutes professional conduct. 71 
Law schools have a responsibility to teach students to think critically not 
only about what the law is, but about what it should be. Barnhizer points out 
that: 
The intellectual relationship between law faculty and the 
profession includes the obligation to serve society through 
challenging and questioning the abuses of the legal system 
(and its judiciary) - far more than simply "giving the 
profession what it wants."72 
This is the strength of what clinical legal education has to offer. Its potential to 
make students reason and choose in context creates the best opportunity for 
educators to instill in them the concepts of professional responsibility, thus 
making the profession as a whole more responsible. Universities cannot hide 
behind their "academic" status to claim that this is not their responsibility. 
Societal concerns are clearly an important consideration to be factored into the 
educational process as it is society which funds these educational facilities. 
Bellows says that: 
The radical potential of the clinical method, however, lies in 
its capacity to deal with these [societal] problems in a more 
total way - in its basic intention to infuse law study with 
experience and knowledge of the legal system in operation, 
and in its capacity to erode or at least foster examination of the 
rigid distinctions between theory and practice, fact and value, 
the subjective and the objective, which underlie the 
dysfunctions of modern social life.73 
Clinical faculty must re-evaluate their methodology to ensure that the 
educational goals of clinical training are being accomplished. Furthermore they 
must find a way to reopen the dialogue between the traditional academics and 
themselves to show that the work of the clinical education program is enhancing 
71 J. Motley, supra note 66 at 218. Redlich comments, however, that because of the large 
number of other factors which are exerting pressure on the student that "as a role-model 
for a value system of professional responsibility, the clinician is a far less dominant figure 
than is the traditional law teacher in a Socratic-method traditional law course." The 
difference is that the traditional law teacher bears most of the responsibility for the 
success of the traditional classroom experience, whereas in the clinical experience the 
student carries a much larger portion of that responsibility. N. Redlich, "The Moral 
Value of Clinical Legal Education: A Reply" (1983) 33 J. Legal Educ. 613 at 615. 
72 Supra note 5 at 129. 
73 Bellow, supra note 14 at 377-378. See also at 394-395. 
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the work of the "casebook" teachers.74 The following portion of this paper 
analyses the structure that clinicians have incorporated into their programs. It 
considers the optimum ways in which these structures can be used to allow the 
values of clinical methodology to be realized and to minimize the possible 
pitfalls.75 
THE STRUCTURE OF CLINICAL PROGRAMS 
Foundation for the Structure 
Technical Skills 
Before an effective structure for clinical education can be designed and 
implemented, the inevitable tension which exists between technical training and 
critical reflection 76 must be clearly understood by the clinician, so that these two 
components of clinical legal education can be made to work in harmony toward 
the same purpose. The performance dimension of clinical education has resulted 
in the natural equating of it with skills training for practical ends.77 There is 
nothing unacademic about the idea that clinical legal education is primarily 
skills training. The danger arises, however, when the term "skills" is defined or 
conceptualized as "technical" skills alone. 
Many outside of the clinical sphere consider skills training in the technical 
sense to be the only educational goal of clinical education and question whether 
it is the function of a university to provide what is essentially the equivalent of 
"trade-school" training.78 To them the university mandate is to teach substantive 
law and theoretical knowledge and to leave the development of practical 
74 "[E]xposure to real problems may lead to better student recognition of the relevance of 
classic legal education as a necessary base for the resolution of real problems." (1968) 
Clinical Committee of UCLA School of Law, Report, in Clinical Legal Education in the 
Law School Curriculum 7, 22 (CLEPR ed. 1970). In R.A. Gorman, "Clinical Legal 
Education: A Prospectus" (1971) 44 S.Cal.L.Rev. 537 at 551. The students at 
Dalhousie's Criminal Clinic whom I spoke with found that their clinical experience has 
increased their interest in the traditional courses they are taking concurrently. By 
becoming aware of the overall structure and dynamic of the legal system through 
immersion in it, the relevance of these hitherto unconnected courses became apparent. 
75 Eleven values and pitfalls of clinical legal education can be found in Gorman, ibid. at 
551-561. 
76 Gross, S.R., "Clinicalism Realism: Simulated Hearings Based on Actual Events in 
Student's Lives" (1990) 40 J. Legal Educ. 321at337. 
77 Supra note 74 at 589-591. 
78 Grossman, supra note 31 at 188. If the primary educational function of a clinic like 
DLAS is to teach skills, then I admit that simulations provide the same training more cost 
effectively. Properly supervised, however, skills training should only be one part of the 
real educational experience, which is exposing the students to themselves in the judicial 
environment in a situation where there is the guidance to learn from this confrontation. 
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techniques and expertise to post-graduation experiences.79 Unless clinicians can 
demonstrate that clinical programs do more than what these critics say they do, 
there is a strong likelihood that clinical education will be marginalized within 
the law school curriculum. Spiegal argues: 
The way to ensure that clinical education has minimal impact 
within the law school world is to equate it with skills training. 
Skills training, by definition, is a marginal activity within 
academic circles. Moreover, viewing clinical education as 
skills makes simulation, the least expensive form of clinical 
education, a more viable competitor to clinical programs with 
real world practice components.80 
There is concern among clinical theorists that clinical legal education is 
gradually falling into this "technical" trap. Hathaway states that "[c]linical 
education, rather than increasing the capacity of students to grapple with tough 
conceptual and contextual questions, has become an exercise in the acquisition 
of lawyering skills."81 There is concern that the clinical movement has 
abandoned its reformist roots in order to move from outside to inside where it is 
"safer" (or more comfortable). 82 
This is often the nature of radicalism. For many, radicalism on their part is 
more of an expression of dissatisfaction with the way things are presently than a 
commitment to an internal vision of the way that things could be. Once they 
achieve a level of success that alleviates some of their personal discomfort, it is 
easy to buy into the system. This internal migration is encouraged by the 
entrenched dominant system which recognizes that a movement too powerful to 
defeat through confrontation can eventually be controlled through the allocation 
of "power"; the discontents are given just enough power to let them think that 
79 Vukovich, "The Lack of Practical Training in Law Schools: Criticisms, Causes and 
Programs for Change" (1971) 23 W. Res. L. Rev. 140 at 152. In Grossman, supra note 
31at190. 
so Supra note 29 at 606-607. 
81 J.C. Hathaway, "Clinical Legal Education" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 239 at 244. 
He adds: 
While skills training can be provided by bar admissions courses, 
articling programmes, and professional life, none of these settings can 
replicate the opportunities for reflection, self-consciousness, and a 
more complete understanding of the legal order which an ordered 
program of clinical education can provide. 
s2 Dean Hill Rivkin during a panel discussion at the Catholic University Law School 
Conference on Clinical Education, October 18, 1986. Panel Discussion, "Clinical Legal 
Education: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future" (1987) 
Cath. Univ. L. Rev. 337 at 340-343. 
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they are accomplishing something, but not enough to substantively alter or 
detract from the status quo. For them, it is easier to take the "safe" route than to 
be out on the edge all the time, and often this seems to be the reasonable thing to 
do. Progress, however, follows on the heels of what is generally considered by 
the peer group of the time to be unreasonable action. 
There has been a cost accompanying this shift in emphasis towards 
technical training in the form of simulations, etc. Tomain and Solimine argue 
that what has been sacrificed is political sensitivity and awareness. They argue 
that clinical education has been bought off by skills training as follows: 
Skills training is significantly more cost-effective thaa live-
client clinics (true). Skills training is non-partisan (false). 
Skills training, some argue, is more susceptible to 
measurement and to empirical study (maybe - but largely 
irrelevant). Thus, the siren call of efficiency, neutrality, and 
scientific objectivity promised to legitimize skills training by 
making it academically respectable. Morally, politically, and 
intellectually, these were dubious reasons. "Efficiency" is an 
excuse for expediency; "neutrality" a mask for self-interest; 
and "scientific objectivity" - when lawyers are measuring 
lawyers - an empty tautology. Combined, these reasons deny 
the necessity of political accountability, subvert public-
spiritedness, and ignore the connection between personal 
growth and professional development. All of which is to say, 
skills training ignores moral education.83 
The continued equating of clinical education with skills training in the 
technical sense serves several purposes. It allows traditional academics to 
continue to marginalize clinicians, thereby reinforcing the security of their own 
positions. Students, trying to prepare for competition in a tough job market, 
want law school to train them in basic skills. Clinical courses are the most 
visible forum for this type of training in most law schools; therefore, students 
consider skills training to be the essential element within clinical programs. The 
intellectual component is considered to be of secondary importance, and is often 
seen as an inconvenient intrusion into their schedules.84 
The existence of this tension between the practical and the intellectual was 
very apparent during my term at DLAS. As a group, the students resented the 
simulations and classroom demands, in particular the paper requirement of the 
course. What papers we did submit were the minimum necessary to discharge 
83 J.P. Tomain and M.E. Solimine, "Skills Skepticism in the Postclinic World" (1990) 40 
J. Legal Educ. 307 at 315. 
84 Supra note 82 at 345; see also Spiegal supra note 29 at 607. 
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what we saw as a "token" academic requirement. To us, the demands of the 
clients and the performance aspects were considered important, and the "school" 
part was seen to be consuming valuable time. On reflection, we failed to 
properly value the existence of this tension and what it had to offer us. What the 
clinic attempted to offer us was an atmosphere where we could, firstly, realize 
the existence of this tension, and, secondly, work towards developing a strategy 
for handling these different pulls with the assistance and guidance of a 
supervisor, an opportunity we will not have once we enter practice. 
Finally, clinicians also find a value in allowing clinical programs to become 
forums for technical skills training. They have an interest in satisfying the 
demands of their students and, to a degree, a responsibility to do so. 85 It was 
difficult enough for clinicians in the days when their primary obstacle was to 
convince the traditionally-oriented faculty members of the value of their work. 
Today, even students are forsaking the social and intellectual emphasis of the 
clinic and demanding pure skills training. Together with the financial arid time 
constraints on clinicians, it is little wonder that clinicians are capitulating to 
pressure. The comparative ease with which technical skills can be taught in 
contrast to the more ambiguous "soft" goals of clinical education makes 
abandoning them an appealing form of retreat. 86 Also, the acceptance of skills 
training by traditional faculty alleviates some of the tension which exists 
between them and the clinicians, making the workplace more comfortable. 
This trend in clinical programs exacts a cost from everyone involved. The 
fundamental values that are forsaken by the focus on technique87 detract from 
the clinical promise of linking means and ends to provide a whole educational 
experience to the student.88 The traditional faculty member loses the benefits of 
the clinical spillover into their classroom, such as increased student motivation 
due to a greater awareness of the value of traditional education. The student 
loses the opportunity to see how technique and human values can be interwoven 
to provide a moral educational experience which will help guide their 
subsequent years in practice.89 The clinician suffers the loss of the opportunity 
to provide students with such an education, and the loss of the opportunity to 
fulfill their initial vision to make legal education socially responsible. 
85 Spiegal, supra note 29 at 607. 
86 Ibid. at 608. Barnhizer feels that the demise of C.L.E.P.R. in 1980, loss of initial 
energy, the "me" generation of students, and static resources of law schools led the 
clinicians to focus on the technical legal skills acquired through the clinic experience as 
justification for the continuation of clinical education. Supra note 5 at 120. 
s7 Barnhizer, ibid. at 121. 
88 Tomain & Solimine, supra note 83 at 313. 
89 Ibid. at 319. 
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Tomain and Solimine point out that skills education " ... is an empty vessel, 
neither good nor bad, neither wrong nor right. Rather, its efficacy and worth 
depend on how we use it and, more significantly, on the ends to which it is 
used."90 It cannot be used to justify the existence of clinical programs,91 but it 
can be used to maximize the clinician's potential to develop the thinking 
capabilities of the student. "Inexorably, the teaching of skills, in able hands, 
leads for a quest for intellectual penetration of the process in which practical 
skills are but surface manifestations and this is precisely where the unique 
contribution of clinical teaching may lie."92 The intellectual component of 
clinical methodology consists of analytical skills which is discussed in the 
following portion of this paper. 
Analytical Skills 
Amsterdam states that three kinds of reasoning are not taught in traditional 
law courses: (1) ends-means thinking; (2) hypotheses formulation and testing in 
information acquisition; and, (3) decision-making in situations where options 
involve differing and often uncertain degrees of risk and promises of different 
sorts.93 These are the very skills which are required in the day-to-day practice of 
law. The clinical method, "with its concern for the interpersonal, intuitive and 
introspective aspects of experience"94 provides these pedagogical possibilities. 
The immersion of the student in the role of "lawyer" provides an experiential 
base for reflective analysis from which meaning and generalizations can be 
drawn.95 
It is fundamental that the clinician provide guidance through these 
experiences so that the student may develop a method for resolving crises and 
making decisions that is based on a consistent personal philosophy of 
lawyering.96 If the student's experiences are uninterpreted, they may "promote 
reflexive behaviour based upon expediency or accepted (although not 
90 Ibid. at 320. 
91 See Barnhizer, supra note 5 at 122-123. 
92 Grossman, supra note 31at191. 
93 Amsterdam, supra note 16 at 614-615. 
94 Bellow, supra note 14 at 385. 
95 Ibid. at 389. , 
96 Gold points out that the various forces which exert pressure on the student result in 
tensions being created. These give rise to confrontations with a number of questions 
linked to professional responsibility and the validity of the legal system. The student's 
behaviour has both a direct impact on the situation and how it is perceived by others. 
These stresses produce energy which must be channeled into constructive advice and 
representation. Supra note 17 at 105. 
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necessarily acceptable) practice."97 It is just this type of ad hoc problem-solving 
that causes problems of professional responsibility. The complexities of actual 
practice offer numerous opportunities to short-cut one's way to a solution. The 
student needs to appreciate the nature of the consequences that arise when this 
kind of narrow thinking is used in problem-solving. Gold points out that: 
By focusing on both objective analysis and subjective reaction 
the clinical teacher may facilitate a kind of learning by both 
student and teacher that maximizes an understanding of the 
complex inter-relationship between law as rules and law as a 
process, within a dynamic system, and of the feelings and 
emotions evoked in the student, teacher and client.98 
The clinical integration of the broader spectrum of the social dynamic into the 
student's educational experience, coupled with its emphasis on the effect of the 
relationship between peoples in the legal system,99 affords the only accurate 
context for the student to learn to cope with questions of personal and 
professional identity. wo 
Proper ends-means analysis requires that all the factors which may affect a 
decision be considered; the student must observe a situation from both an 
objective and subjective analytical perspective. It is only as the student's 
technical skills are developed in a contextual and conceptual environment with 
the interaction of the supervisor as observer/participant, that the student is able 
to visualize his or her actions as part of the larger professional and social 
dynamic. to1 Through this visualization, the student develops a methodology for 
formulating consistent and effective courses of action. 
The development of such a methodology helps the student to avoid the trap 
of simple acceptance of legal reasoning as a guiding instrument for decision-
making. Klare believes that traditional teaching reinforces the erroneous belief 
that legal reasoning leads to legal results, as though legal doctrine had a 
determinate meaning. This kind of reasoning ignores the political, moral, and 
cultural context of legal rules, without which the political and ethical meaning of 
the doctrines cannot be properly understood. Only the student who possesses 
the tools of interdisciplinary social analysis can exercise the kind of doctrinal 
inquiry which is capable of revealing the indeterminate character of legal 
reasoning. 102 This kind of student can use the legal system to seek justice, as 
97 Ibid. at 105. 
98 Ibid. at 105-106. 
99 Bellow, supra note 19 at 621-622. 
100 Bellow, supra note 14 at 393. 
101 See Tomain & So Ii mine, supra note 83 at 310. 
102 Klare, supra note 6 at 339-341. 
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opposed to perpetuating injustice where the system is deficient. The clinical 
methodology's merger of technical and analytical skills not only debunks the 
myth of legal reasoning, but also provides the student with contextual reasoning 
to take its place. 
It is important, therefore, that the technical skills component of clinical legal 
education not be separated from the analytical component. Both are integral 
parts of the practice of lawyering, and the clinical program must be structured so 
as to keep the two constantly pivoting off of each other. An understanding of 
the contextual implications of these two types of skills will help the student 
integrate them with those acquired through the traditional casebook-based 
courses. It is not so much a question of which skills are important, but what 
balance of skills will result in the student receiving the best legal education 
possible. 103 
The Structure Itself 
The Role of the Supervisor 
The potential of clinical legal education rests in the hands of the supervisor 
responsible for overseeing the students' clinical experiences. Bellows states that 
all the pedagogical learning possibilities of clinical education are "possibilities 
directly related to the interventions of a teacher into the student's experience." 104 
The tendency for things that are left to themselves to degenerate into chaos is 
true of the clinical experience for the student. The supervisor is possessed with 
the ability to place the student's experiences into a coherent learning structure so 
that they make sense to the student. Without this intervention the educational 
experience will consist of the ad hoc type of learning which is unpredictable and 
unrelated to the larger picture. ws 
While bearing ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of clinical 
programs, clinical teachers are also beset with numerous difficulties. These 
103 See Amsterdam, supra note 16 at 615. 
104 Bellow, supra note 14 at 386. And at 386-387: 
The function of clinical teaching, whether in one-to-one relationships, 
small groups, or the large classroom, is to enlist the motivations, 
impressions, and relationships of role performance in efforts to 
enhance self-reflection, self-consciousness and a more encompassing 
understanding of those phenomena of the legal order which are the 
focus of pedagogic inquiry. 
105 It is supervision which distinguishes clinical training from the unstructured 
experiences students receive after graduation, and thus justifies the expense of clinical 
programs. P.T. Hoffman, "Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process" (1982) 
Ariz. St. L. J. 277 at 280. 
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difficulties come from without and within, although many of the internal 
problems are rooted in external pressures. 106 Some of these can be resolved by 
the clinician acting alone; others require the cooperation of those outside the 
immediate clinical sphere. Unless these problems are resolved, however, the 
effectiveness of clinical education will be diminished or ultimately destroyed. 
The greatest danger arising from these difficulties is that the innovative 
qualities that characterize clinical education will be subsumed by the "work" 
component, with the result that "the clinical process and subject matter will 
become rigidly self-contained, anti-intellectual, and suffocating." 107 In order for 
clinical education to continue to grow and develop, its methodology needs to be 
creatively expanded to include other areas of the law school curriculum. 
Condlin has criticized the clinician's failure to develop an intellectual theory that 
can guide clinical education towards the future: 
In our zeal to establish ourselves physically and financially we 
have neglected the intellectual dimension of our work. We 
have not developed a theory that allows us to criticize, in a 
fundamental way, the existing arrangements and procedures of 
law practice and legal instruction (including clinical legal 
instruction). We have allowed our potentially important 
contributions to these fields to become mechanical and 
technical, and to remain at the level of "methodology." Even 
at this level, our lack of a critical perspective has caused us to 
replicate many objectionable practices to which our movement 
was a formative response. We have lost sight of our roots, our 
objectives, and our potential, and we do this at our peril. JOR 
The failure to develop the intellectual component of clinical work can be traced 
to a more fundamental problem facing the clinician. The lack of support for 
clinical programs has forced the clinician to operate in a variety of roles from 
fundraiser to administrator to educator. The operational demands of clinical 
education can consume so much of the clinician's time and energy that little is 
left to ensure that the quality of supervisory input is maintained at a high level. 109 
106 The historical conflict between traditionalists and clinicians has led to many of these 
difficulties. See discussion, supra on the history of clinical legal education. See also 
McDiarmid, supra note 12 at 246; Barnhizer, supra note 5 at 87-95; S.F. Befort, 
"Musings on a Clinic Report: A Selective Agenda for Clinical Legal Education in the 
1990s" (1991), 75 Minn. L. Rev. 619 [hereinafter "Musings"]. 
107 Barnhizer, supra note 5, at 105. And ibid.: "[M]any legal academics have greatly 
expanded their intellectual horizons in the l 980's while active clinical faculty and the 
clinical movement generally do not seem to have progressed, often retreating into 
technique and instrumentalism." 
ws Condlin, supra note 2 at 604. 
109 Hathaway, supra note 81 at 244. Veinott points to her DLAS experience to say that 
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Trying to find an answer to these basic difficulties facing clinicians is 
beyond the scope of this paper. At present, the best that clinicians can do is 
realize that these dangers exist, and continually re-evaluate their activity to keep 
the clinical program on course. A careful structuring of the clinical program 
with respect to goals and specific ways to achieve those goals will do much to 
ensure that the clinical program maintains its educational focus. 
Structure in Terms of Goal Definition 
Although clinical programs must be designed to operate within the scope 
allowed by the law school's resource base, it is important that the program be 
part of a planned instructional process with specific educational goals in sight. 110 
This will increase the benefit of the student's educational experience in the short 
term, and will create a solid foundation for the possible expansion of the clinical 
program in the long run. Hoffman mentions three separate but interrelated steps 
which should guide the progression of a clinical course: 
(1) the determination of course objectives, (2) the selection of 
learning experiences to accomplish the course objectives, and 
(3) the arrangement of those learning experiences to maximize 
the achievement of the course objectives. 111 
What is happening through these steps is that the student's specific experiences 
are given a generalized meaning so that, through "structured inquiry, reflection 
and analysis," 112 the student is given the opportunity to develop principles of 
lawyering. Every component of the clinical experience that is under the control 
of the clinician must be designed so that it forms part of an interrelated structure 
that achieves the course objectives. There are enough unpredictable variables 
within the clinical experience to provide the random day-to-day excitement 
which the student finds motivational. The only way these can be given meaning 
"The difficulties encountered with respect to supervision are traceable to a variety of 
factors including inherent defects in all systems of supervision, time pressures requiring 
that certain tasks are performed immediately, and most acutely, lack of funding which 
results in a more or less chronic shortage of lawyers to provide supervision." Supra note 
15 at 13. 
110 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 278. See also Hathaway, supra note 81at246-247. 
111 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 278. Bellow raises some questions which clinical 
educators must address when planning a clinical program: (1) what is the level of self-
consciousness about learning which is attempted to be generated, (2) what level of 
complexity are students to be confronted with, (3) what should be the scope of what is 
being taught from social policy to statistical, empirically based data etc., and (4) what is 
the appropriate role of sequence and progression in the content conveyed? Bellow, supra 
note 14 at 399-401. 
112 Gold, supra note 17 at 98. 
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is if the remainder of the program is carefully designed. 
Although the specific goals of clinical education may vary according to the 
nature of different clinical options, the fundamental goal of creating a process 
through which the student will "learn how to learn" is common to all. It is 
important that the student be made aware at the beginning of their clinical 
enrollment, if not before, of these course objectives. This awareness will 
alleviate the problem of student resistance to skills training courses, seminars, 
etc., which they feel are not related to the clinical objectives. 
It is in the selection and arrangement of learning experiences thar there is 
the greatest potential to create a successful clinical experience. To achieve this, 
clinicians need to have an understanding of the educational theory that 
underlines the methods that they incorporate into the clinical program. Certain 
kinds of learning are enhanced by the use of specific educational methods, and 
clinicians must recognize these differences in order to maximize their 
effectiveness. 
Learning Theory 
There are two basic types of learning: (1) information assimilation - passive 
learning, and (2) experiential learning - active learning. 113 Traditional legal 
education, especially with its shift towards the lecture format, emphasizes the 
transfer of knowledge approach to education which is characteristic of passive 
learning. 114 Also known as expository teaching, this type of learning is best at 
conveying information for the purpose of transferring knowledge, although not 
necessarily at enabling the student to comprehend exactly how the knowledge 
interacts to produce results. It is not effective at developing abilities to apply, 
analyze, synthesize, or evaluate knowledge. 115 This kind of learning experience 
also incorporates the "banking" method of learning through which the student 
deposits information unquestioningly into his or her mental data banks. 
Clinical education, with its heavy emphasis on the interaction between 
student and teacher, is essentially experiential learning,116 although it does rely 
on some elements of passive learning in the early stages. 117 The ability of 
clinical education to make the knowledge that the student has received through 
113 Barrette, supra note 32 at 62-63. 
114 Gold, supra note 17 at I 05. 
ll5 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 301. 
116 Barrette, supra note 32 at 47. . 
117 Introductory seminars via the classroom component into the operation of the clinical 
program, administrative structures of agencies the student will be dealing with, basic 
skills in interviewing, negotiating, and litigation, all rely on passive learning to provide 
the student with enough knowledge from which to begin to learn experientially. 
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expository teaching meaningful by contextual application, enhances the nature 
of the student's passive learning experiences, and provides them with the 
motivation to acquire more knowledge related to these experiences. 11 8 The 
supervisor's responses to specific issue-related questions that the student raises 
also illustrates expository learning. The problem with this method is that the 
learning process tends to be haphazard as neither the student nor the supervisor 
want to enter into lengthy discussions at this time. 119 However, subsequent 
generalization by the supervisor through structured student-teacher dialogue can 
give a spatial connection to these specific learning experiences. 
The clinical process can be reduced to two essential parts: "(1) the student 
acting in the role of a lawyer representing a real or imaginary client, and (2) the 
student and teacher then engage in a dialogue designed to enable the student to 
learn from the lawyering experience." 120 Hoffman points out that role 
assumption coupled with supervision, is a powerful pedagogical tool to achieve 
several educational objectives. These include: (I) lawyering skills, including 
higher forms such as application, analysis, synthesis, and judgment, as well as 
the realities of the legal practice; (2) general knowledge about the legal 
environment which the student is about to enter; (3) motivation within the 
students entering the clinical experience creates the "need to know" which leads 
to more effort and more learning; and, (4) increase in professional identity and 
responsibility .121 
The assumption of the role of "lawyer" is one of the major factors which 
leads many students to engage in clinical programs, hoping to try on the mantle 
in a protected environment, as opposed to during their articling period when 
their chances of being rehired depend on their performance. The role assumed 
by the student has to be carefully designed, however, so that there is adequate 
time to allow students opportunity for reflection and debate on their activities 
within the role. 122 It is therefore important that the caseload of the student be 
well balanced in order to avoid too heavy a workload or one that does not 
encompass a broad enough spectrum of experience. 
During my term at DLAS the students operated under a heavy volume of 
cases (25-35) and a shortage of supervision. The result was that we spent most 
of our time dealing with the basic requirements of client service. Little 
opportunity was available for development of the analytical, reflective skills 
11 8 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 303. 
11 9 Ibid. at 304. The dialogue is important. Otherwise the student will be unable to 
transfer the application of this knowledge to other situations. 
120 Kotkin, supra note 32 at 186. 
121 Supra note 105 at 284-286. 
122 Hathaway, supra note 81 at 252. 
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which are so important to clinical work. Also, there was considerable 
duplication of files in areas such as family benefits and divorce, with the result 
that the range of experiences, especially in litigation, was limited. For us, it felt 
like the service factor for the community was the driving force behind DLAS, 
and not the educational advantages offered by the clinical method. This view 
was based on the student perception of what clinical law was supposed to be 
about, and on the time constraints on the supervisors, which hindered their 
attempts to expand the educational base. 
Intervention 
Another important factor in determining the student's ability to learn from 
acting in role is the degree of intervention by the supervisor into the student's 
responsibilities within the role. For the student to derive educational benefit and 
meaning from their actions in role, they must bear primary responsibility for the 
exercise. 123 The supervisor, while "letting go" of responsibility to the student, 
must intervene systematically to ensure that the student is learning through his or 
her This tension between the supervisor and the student becomes 
even greater when the supervisor considers intervention in order _to protect the 
interests of the client. 124 The timing and extent of intervention by the supervisor 
greatly affects the student's learning experience in role; therefore, the nature of 
intervention must be clearly understood by the supervisor. 125 
Intervention takes place on two levels. The first begins in the early stages 
of the student's acceptance of responsibility within the role and continues 
throughout the duration of the role. At this stage, intervention is in the nature of 
guidance only, answering student inquiries, and posing questions about 
alternative courses of action to stimulate the student to think expansively and 
creatively. This intervention allows the student to take on the responsibilities of 
the role to the extent that he or she is capable. It also allows the supervisor to 
get a sense of the student's capabilities so that the student is not given more 
responsibility than he or she can handle. This type of intervention requires that 
good communication be maintained between the student and the supervisor, and 
that the supervisor knows what is going on and has a sense of where things 
123 Barrette, supra note 32 at 55. "[l]t is the responsibility they are given ... for the 
consequences which turns mere observation into a clinical experience." A. Boone; M. 
Jeeves; and J. MacFarlane, "A Working Model for Clinical Legal Education" (1987) 21 
The Law Teacher 172 at 179. 
124 Barrette, supra note 32 at 63. 
125 "The dilemma presented to the clinical teacher is the nearly simultaneous integration 
of an educational 'process' with content and the providing of competent, professional 
legal service." Ibid. at 56. 
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should be going. 
The second level involves direct intervention by the clinical teacher into the 
process in a manner that replaces the student's control of the situation with that 
of the teacher. This type of intervention "changes the experience for all 
concerned," 126 and "disturbs the student-teacher and student-client relationships 
in ways that can produce undesired and unintended consequences."127 
Critchlow presents five factors which should be considered in any decision 
by a supervisor to intervene directly into the student's control of a case. 12s (1) 
The nature of the student-client relationship. The supervisor must take into 
account who the client believes has primary responsibility for their case as the 
confidence of the client is not automatically transferable to the supervisor. (2) 
The degree of informed consent the client gives to being represented by the 
student should increase the latitude that the student is given to bear the 
responsibilities of representation. This also depends on the availability of 
alternative opportunities for representation for the client. (3) The teacher's 
familiarity with the student should provide him or her with an accurate 
assessment of the ability of the student to maintain control of the situation. The 
less familiar the supervisor is with the student, the lower the threshold should be 
before intervention occurs. (4) The supervisor's familiarity with the file should 
be considerable before they choose to intervene. If the supervisor is not aware 
of all the details, his or her generic capabilities will not necessarily result in a 
more efficient handling of the situation. (5) If the continued exercise of control 
by the student is likely to have an adverse affect on the client's emotional status, 
or duties owed to opposing counsel and third parties, the supervisor should. not 
be afraid to intervene. Reference to these factors by the supervisor before 
deciding to intervene will enhance the student's ability to maximize his or her 
learning in the role and provide responsible representation of the client's 
interests. 
My own experience with supervisor intervention on this level illustrates the 
dangers involved in the second level of intervention. I represented a client in a 
wrongful dismissal dispute where the supervisor intervened into the ongoing 
126 G. Critchlow, "Professional Responsibility, Student Practice, and the Clinical 
Teacher's Duty to Intervene" (1990-91) Gonzaga L. Rev. 415 at 419. 
127 /bid.at416. And,at428: 
There are two standards for intervention at this level: (1) only to avoid irreparable harm 
to the client; and, (2) when there is a serious departure in the student's work from the 
standard which the teacher would practice. The first focuses on the educational 
experience of the student foremost and questions whether the teacher's ideas are 
necessarily better than the student's. This view is held by more teachers than lawyers. 
The second standard is practised by more lawyers than teachers. 
12s Ibid. at 430-437, note 165. 
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negotiations to unilaterally bring them to an end, undermining the position that I 
had taken with the opposing counsel. Although there may have been valid 
reasons for her concern that the negotiations were taking too long, thus 
prejudicing my client, I was taken aback when I opened the file to see that action 
had already been taken without any discussion between us, or between the client 
and the supervisor. I was disturbed by this and embarrassed by the thought that 
the opposing counsel must now consider me to be incompetent. 
The supervisor's sense of duty as a practitioner over educator likely caused 
her to take this course of action, and quite possibly these hard-line tactics were 
necessary in the situation. There was, however, little educational value to me in 
the way that it was handled. This illustrates not only the tension among the roles 
within which the supervisor has to operate, but also the fact that the supervisor 
may not understand the educational goals of the clinical experience and his or 
her role in creating this atmosphere of learning. 129 
My supervisor's actions also ·had an immediate effect on my ability or 
willingness to operate within role under her supervision. Shortly afterwards, we 
were in court on another matter. In previous appearances in court under a 
different supervisor I had been responsible for everything and felt relatively 
comfortable. In this appearance, however, my supervisor appeared reluctant to 
grant me the same degree of control to which I was used. Unsure of my 
position, the result was that I withdrew from any direct function in the court 
proceedings and took on the role of observer only. 
Role Assumption vs. Role Modeling 
The educational theory of learning in "role" has not been without its critics. 
Kotkin has written an article questioning the ability of role assumption to satisfy 
the needs of every student. 130 His argument is that the emphasis on role 
assumption within the clinical program may benefit only those students whose 
make-up enables them to learn from this style. 131 Kotkin sets out four steps in 
the experiential learning model: (1) an immersion in experience, (2) which 
provides a basis for reflection, (3) thus allowing for the formulation of abstract 
concepts etc., (4) the implications of which are tested in new experiential 
situations. 132 Using Kolb's teachings on learning theory 133 Kotkin points out 
129 This was a supervisor new to involvement in an educational clinical program and she 
was probably most comfortable as a practitioner at this point in time. 
I3o Kotkin, supra note 32. 
13 1 Ibid. at 186-187. 
132 Ibid. at 194-196. 
133 Kolb (in D. Kolb, I. Rubin & J.M. Mcintyre, Organizational Psychology: An 
Experiential Approach (Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971) at 29) identifies four 
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that using the experiential model obviously creates certain problems for the 
converger and the assimilator. He suggests that the clinician can " .. .improve the 
learning process for some students by facilitating their ability to function in role, 
rather than concentrating only on the reflection and abstraction stages of the 
experiential cycle."134 
The individual make-up of the student should be given careful consideration 
when they are being "placed" within the clinical structure. The nature of the 
student-teacher relationship in the clinical program allows for the kind of 
flexibility, not possible in the traditional course structure. In traditional courses, 
all students are evaluated on the basis of a common examination, which does not 
take into account the idiosyncrasies of the individuals. 135 Rather than reapplying 
the traditional evaluation method, the clinical supervisor should adjust the 
methodology to take account of the kind of student they are dealing with. 
Kotkin suggests role-modeling as an alternative to role assumption. 136 
Hoffman has defined role-modeling as: 
[T]he acquisition of behaviors, beliefs, and values through the 
students' identification with the supervisor. It is like 
demonstration in that the student learns through observation of 
the supervisor's behavior and performance, but it differs in 
that the teaching is indirect and generally unintentional ... 
Due to the significant role the clinical teacher plays in the 
student's training, the closeness of the working relationship 
between student and teacher, and the authority aspect of the 
teacher's position, the clinical teacher will be one of the 
primary role models to whom students are exposed. 137 
While acknowledging that clinicians tend to view role-modeling as inherently 
unsystematic and inefficient, 138 Kotkin argues that this method can bridge the 
types of learners: (1) converger, (2) diverger, (3) assimilator, and (4) accommodator. 
Kotkin argues that the converger is best at the 3rd & 4th steps above; the diverger at the 
I st and 2nd; the assimilator at the 2nd and 3rd, and the accommodator at the I st and 4th. 
Kotkin, supra note 32 at 194-196. 
134 Kotkin, ibid. at 196. 
135 Judging a student's qualifications to be a "good" lawyer on the basis of this 
evaluation method is absurd. I, and others, have felt that a course in hypothetical 
examination writing would be of more value than teaching substantive law, insofar as the 
scheme of assigning marks is designed. It almost seems that our law schools are 
evaluating who is competent to be professorial candidates rather than practicing lawyers. 
Very good students, who will and do make very good lawyers, often do not do well on 
law school examinations. 
136 Kotkin, supra note 32 at 199-202. 
137 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 300. 
13s Kotkin, supra note 32 at 199. 
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gap for students who have difficulty in immersing themselves in a role.139 The 
student sees the supervisor bearing the same responsibilities that the student has 
been instructed to bear, and thus has a model for enhanced performance. 140 
The ability of role modeling, which takes place whether the supervisor is 
conscious of it or not, to operate in a constructive manner depends in large part 
on the nature of the teacher/student dialogue. This dialogue is also an integral 
part of the student's ability to learn from his or her acting in role. In many 
respects, this is the crux of the supervisor's responsibilities towards the student 
in the clinical program. The next portion of this paper examines the dynamics of 
this relationship. 
Student/Teacher Dialogue 
The success or failure of the clinical program, from an educational 
perspective, is largely determined by the exchanges which take place between 
the student and the supervisor. In this context the student's experiences are 
given meaning through the creation of a schematic of lawyering. It is here that 
everything is sorted and, if possible, reconciled. 
The exchange between the student and the supervisor makes possible what 
is known as the dialectic method of teaching. It consists of individual discussion 
and reasoning where "the teacher serves as a sounding board for the student's 
intellectual explorations and as a prod forcing and encouraging the student to 
objectively and critically examine actions and purposes."141 Barrette sees the 
teacher's role as being that of "agent or negotiator of the interpreted 
experience." 142 
The strength of the dialectic method is in its ability to develop the "higher 
cognitive functions of comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid.at 202: 
[role modeling] ... requires a discomforting degree of self-exposure 
and revelation on the part of the teacher. But this is exactly what 
clinical teachers ask of their students, and it is on the students' ability 
to comply with this request that clinical teachers judge them ... The 
solution here depends on the clinician's leading the way through 
honest self-reflection, which also accomplishes the function of 
creating a model for the students' process of self-reflection. 
141 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 306. He adds that "the frequently heard call for increased 
intellectual content in clinical courses is often nothing more than an unarticulated demand 
for greater use of the dialectic form of teaching." Ibid. 
142 Barrette, supra note 32 at 65. 
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evaluation." 143 It is through the connection of these somewhat more abstract 
concepts with the practice of lawyering in a social and interpersonal context that 
the student can be educated in how to develop "their own reflective system of 
justice." 144 Kreiling points out that it is through subsequent structured reflection 
that the learning value of an experience is maximized. 145 To properly reflect on 
an experience, it is necessary that the student consider it in context and from all 
perspectives. Only the dialectic method of teaching can provide the opportunity 
for this through the constant exertion of positive motivational pressure on the 
student. 
Without this constant pressure forcing reflection on decisions and actions, 
students will think only in terms of what gets the job done quickly and easily. 
The result is that students will simply reinforce the characteristics, skills, and 
habits which they brought with them into the clinical experience. Critchlow 
argues that the clinical teacher has a responsibility to expand the student's 
resource base: 
Because students tend to solve a problem any way they can, 
they are more likely to use their strongest skills than to try to 
overcome their deficiencies. They learn to survive only on 
these strengths unless the clinical teacher designs a system for 
assuring minimum proficiency over a full range of core 
competencies which apply to all legal tasks. 146 
My experience at DLAS certainly verifies this. To some extent one can get by 
using prepossessed skills. Unless the specific skills necessary to perform a task 
are developed, however, the student develops a tendency to procrastinate, 
because then he or she does not really know how to complete the job. The use 
of secondary abilities is seldom enough to complete the task. Soon, a backlog of 
minor details is created that ultimately results in a seemingly insurmountable 
workload. 147 
In particular, the student must be queried to force an examination of how 
143 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 308. Hoffman points out that the dialectic method is not 
as effective in communicating information in the first instance (expository learning) or in 
providing skills training (experienced learning). 
144 Barnhizer, supra note 5 at 112. 
145 K. Kreiling, "Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning 
to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision," (1981) 40 
Md. Law Rev. 284 at 286. 
146 Critchlow, supra note 126 at 430, ff. 45. 
147 In the traditional curriculum, paper courses aside, there rarely is a backlog problem 
which cannot be resolved in three days with a borrowed set of cans. In DLAS this 
approach does not work, partly because of the nature of the work and partly because of 
the psychological pressure of having a dependent client and an implacable court. 
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personal values and ideas can affect their handling of situations, sometimes to 
the client's detriment. Barrette points out how the values which the student 
holds may affect the advice which he or she gives the client.148 The advice is not 
then based necessarily on what is best for the client in the particular situation but 
on what the student believes is best given his or her own value system. The 
student-teacher dialogue has the potential to expose this tendency to the student. 
Upon further reflection, this should cause the student to consider this factor 
when making decisions in the future. The intent is not to "change" the student's 
methodology to a more "correct" path but to open the student's eyes to the 
internal factors which shape the student's responses. 149 
One of the greatest dangers in the dialectic method is that there is a 
tendency for the teacher to lead the student towards the conclusion that the 
teacher wants to see the student reach. This has been referred to as the 
"persuasion method" of teaching. Condlin argues that the power inherent in the 
clinical teacher's position of authority allows him or her to use "subtle 
manipulative techniques" to either impose his or her views on students, or at 
least to get them to act in accordance with these views. 150 He feels that this kind 
of dialogue is the norm between student and teacher. The problem is that unless 
the student feels that his or her "perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and 
motivations" are taken into consideration by the teacher, any attempt by the 
teacher to give meaning to the behaviour in question may be considered invalid 
or inadequate by the student. 151 
The pressures of clinical work create an environment which can force 
clinicians to adopt, perhaps unconsciously, the use of the persuasion model in 
their discussions with the student. Obvious factors include time constraints and 
administrative demands. A less apparent reason is the tension arising from the 
clinician's attempt to balance the development of student autonomy while still 
"controlling" the representation of the client. The one-sidedness of the 
148 Barrette, supra note 32 at 47-51. 
149 "[W]hen the student shows emotional resistance to certain values or ideas, dialectic 
teaching may expose the source of resistance and resolve the difficulty." Hoffman, supra 
note 105 at 309. "Insofar as racism, class, and sexism are part of one's culture, they are 
also part of one's own behaviour, and no substantive vision can emerge without some 
consciousness of their impact on each of us." Bellow, supra note 19 at 621. 
150 Condlin, supra note 2 at 605. For a discussion about the characteristics of clinicians 
which allow for the development of these manipulative techniques and how these 
characteristics are developed, see 606-607. "The clinical teacher inevitably becomes an 
advocate, and as Aristotle remarked, the advocate (or rhetorician) is oriented primarily to 
the task of persuading an audience rather than that of understanding or informing." 
Barnhizer, supra note 5 at 104. 
151 Barrette, supra note 32 at 65. 
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persuasion method acts like a defensive mechanism to alleviate many of these 
tensions. 152 Also, clinicians do not often find it easy to let go of their own 
beliefs in order to engage in the penetrating type of discourse which would allow 
the student to develop their own. The discussion should serve to penetrate the 
teacher's value system as well as the student's. Barnhizer argues that "[c]linical 
faculty must, in fact, be far more willing than they have been to explore 
competing concepts of practical justice, often calling into question the 
legitimacy of their own beliefs." 153 
Students may also be less willing to engage in a discussion where they feel 
that they are not going to be treated as equals. 154 Bellows sreaks about the 
tendency of students in the later years of their education to try to shake off the 
"student" label, with its connotation of subservience to a dominant authority, 
and emerge into a new, independent status. At the same time, the teacher 
validates their identity as teacher by continuing to see the student as a student. 155 
Hoffman points out that: "Few students possess the personal composure 
necessary to intellectually challenge a supervisor and stay in the debate until the 
end, even if the end still finds the two parties at different conclusions." 156 
Instead, students tend to listen in order to be able to assert what the teacher is 
saying in the case of an ambiguity .157 The nature of the clinical experience 
s.hould be to try to help the student in attempting to make the transition from 
student to whatever he or she chooses to be. 
To facilitate a constructive dialogue with the student, the clinician needs to 
develop the skill of active listening. By controlling the tendency to judge, and 
learning to understand the student's actions from the student's point of view, the 
teacher is able to understand the reasons behind the student's frame of 
reference. 158 Known as the "learning mode" of teaching, this kind of dialogue 
causes the student to question the teacher in order to work with the teacher to 
clarify any ambiguity that may exist. 159 This kind of dialogue stimulates 
students to bring thoughtful consideration to every stage of the problem-solving 
process. 160 In this way, creativity is encouraged instead of conformity; the 
152 Barrette, supra note 32 at 71. 
153 Supra note 5 at 111. 
154 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 309. 
155 Bellow, supra note 14 at 392. 
156 Supra note 105 at 309. 
157 S. Hartwell, "Moral Development, Ethical Conduct and Clinical Education" (1990) 
35 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 131at148. 
158 Barrette, supra note 32 at 69-70. This empathetic understanding tears down the 
barrier to effective communication. 
159 Hartwell, supra note 157 at 148. See also, Barrette, supra note 32 at 57-58. 
l60 Hathaway, supra note 81at254. 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 239 
student becomes a part of the redefining of the law, making it better reflect the 
changing needs of society. 
There is another aspect of the clinical structure which may be considered as 
an extension of the dialectic process. This aspect is the paper requirement which 
most clinical programs place on the student. It is the interaction with the 
supervisor which provides the student with the skills necessary to thoughtfully 
reflect on his or her experiences in the clinical program. 161 The paper 
requirement is an ideal opportunity for the student to gather those reflections and 
formulate them into a coherent structure. 
It is important that the required paper be designed to facilitate the student's 
need for reflection. Therefore, it should not require legal research per se but 
should allow the student to speak openly about their personal feelings of their 
clinical experience. Students might then be less hostile to what they perceive as 
a token academic requirement. 162 Papers could also provide useful information 
to enhance the development of the program for future students. Students who 
wish to research a particular topic should certainly be allowed to do so; the 
paper requirement should embrace equally both possibilities. 
Alternatively, students could extend their reflections into a post-clinical 
paper. 163 The concept of individual research papers by post-clinic students was 
seen as an opportunity to give back to the Clinic input that would enable it to 
become even more effective in the future. 
It became clear to me as I researched this paper that I had not gained from 
my clinical experience the educational value that I could have. It had been all 
too easy to become caught up in the practical skills aspect of clinical work and 
to resent the clinicians' attempts to provide an academic atmosphere, which I 
construed as a hindrance in my busy schedule. Through this paper I have had 
the opportunity to reflect upon my experiences while they are still fresh in my 
mind, and I am learning more now than I did while I was immersed in the 
clinical program. I do not feel that this need necessarily be the experience of all 
clinical students; pre-clinic preparation materials could provide the student with 
161 Hathaway speaks of students being provided with a "period of disengagement from 
clinical activities in order to reflect on and analyze the issues raised by the course 
objectives." Ibid. at 255. 
162 "Given the enthusiasm with which students normally embrace the experiential 
component, there will be resentment and withdrawal in the face of a seminar or writing 
requirement that is perceived to be unduly disruptive of the other facets of the clinical 
initiative." Ibid. at 255-256. 
163 This was an early suggestion by Gorman. Supra note 74 at 551. In those clinical 
programs which are likely to generate a protracted and reflective piece of writing from 
the student participants, the semester after the clinical experience could be used for the 
preparation of such written work. 
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an understanding of what they are expected to gain from the clinical experience 
and how. Once out of the forest, the trees are clearer, however, and a post-cligic 
paper will enhance the student's learning experience. 
This consideration of the clinical structure is by no means comprehensive. 
Many of the technical details of clinical program structure are omitted by 
focusing on: (1) the supervisory role; (2) goal definition; and, (3) student-
teacher dialogue. It is hoped that the focus of this paper will provide a solid 
philosophical base around which to orient the various structural details of the 
clinical program that any law school intends to implement. 
OTHER KINDS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
The bulk of this paper has focussed on the live-client in-house method of clinical 
legal education. There are, however, other clinical options available. I discuss 
two: simulations and externships. In light of this discussion, I then reconsider 
the net value of a program such as DLAS to the curriculum. 
Simulations 
Simulations fulfill many of the objectives of clinical education. Other 
advantages include its cost-efficiency, its ability to focus on narrow issues and 
its ability to allow students to learn without the fears that accompany personal 
representation of a live client. 164 Whereas clinical programs structured around 
real cases are driven by the interests of the client and the legal system, the 
simulation is driven by the interests of the class and can be designed to fit 
specific pedagogical goals. 165 Simulations also give the student the chance to 
acquire fundamental skills and learn practical guidelines in a situation that has 
enough pressure to ensure that the student makes a conscious effort to act within 
the role. The student is able to learn from mistakes before they have a real effect 
on a real client. 
At the same time, simulations are unable to reproduce the learning 
environment that live-client or externship programs offer. Hoffman points out: 
On the other hand simulation cannot approximate the greater 
factual richness and uncertainty introduced by real cases. Nor 
does simulation cause the same intensity of emotional 
involvement as actual cases, thereby giving the simulation a 
make-believe quality. Without emotional involvement, 
164 Boone, Jeeves, Macfarlane, supra note 123 at 172. See also Gorman, supra note 74 
at 540. 
l65 Gross, supra note 76 at 321. See also Hoffman, supra note 105 at 290-291, for ten 
reasons in support of simulations. 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
students are not forced to confront and resolve ethical 
problems, a necessary requirement in the teaching of 
professional responsibility .166 
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In short, simulations do not provide the real life context that is so important to 
the effectiveness of clinical programs. As a result, they should not be seen as 
adequate replacements for live-client clinical experience, but rather as a 
supplement to it. 
Externship Programs 
Externship programs such as Dalhousie's Criminal Clinic are the most 
effective way to extend the scope of clinical programs within the law school 
curriculum. They are less expensive than live-client in-house programs, 167 and 
put little additional strain on the law school facilities. They also expose the 
student to the operation of the law in real life situations, creating the kinds of 
tensions which the clinical methodology relies on to motivate students to reflect 
analytically. 
Because externship programs can take place in specialized areas of law, 
virtually all students can enjoy the benefits of clinical education. A student who 
is able to extern in an area in which he or she has a special interest has the 
motivation to learn as much as possible from the experience. 168 Stickgold points 
out: 
The externship model makes it viable to consider some clinical 
experience for all graduating students. It promotes 
experimentation and flexibility in program design. It promotes 
integration of relationships among the academy, bench, and 
bar. It utilizes legal resources in a more rational and 
coordinated manner. Properly structured, it reduces academic 
arrogance, while still allowing legal educators to play critical 
roles around the design, implementation, and supervision of 
the programs, and it reduces academic impotence, since it does 
not demand that academic faculty do well what they cannot, or 
do not want to, do at all. 169 
Finally, externships also expose the student to areas of law that the traditional 
curriculum cannot. These include judges' chambers, prosecutors' offices, and 
corporate and government legal departments. 
166 Hoffman, supra note 105 at 291. 
167 Motley places the cost of externships as being between in-house clinics and 
traditional courses. Supra note 66 at 224. 
l68 Stickgold, supra note 12 at 316. 
169 Stickgold, supra note 12 at 317. 
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Externship programs are not without their problems, however. They take 
place outside of the school and under the direction of a practitioner, rather than 
an academic. This situation can lead to " ... inequalities in experience and a 
difficulty in relating the experience to the aims of a particular course." 170 The 
problem of academic control of the student's learning experience affects almost 
all externship programs. Without this academic control, the student is subjected 
to the type of ad hoc learning experience that clinical methodology strives to 
avoid. It is important that externship programs be structured to allow the student 
the benefits of the clinical methodology; that is, experiential learning coupled 
with dialectic teaching. 
Live-Client In-House Clinics: DLAS Revisited 
The benefits of the clinical methodology are potentially best fulfilled by this 
type of program. There is a much greater degree of law school control over the 
educational aspect of the student's experiences. 171 The commitment of the law 
school to meeting the legal needs of the poor within the community coupled 
with the visible statement that there should be a presence within the community 
"provides an ethical and social education for students that simply cannot be 
replicated in any other setting." 172 
The difficulties in setting up such a clinical program are immense in light of 
the constricted fiscal resources of universities today. In DLAS we have such a 
structural program; it would be a considerable loss to the future of clinical 
education at Dalhousie, not to mention the community, if DLAS was forced to 
close. 
A major reason for DLAS's present position is that it has operated almost as 
a separate educational program outside of the law school. All of the clinical 
programs seem to operate as educational afterthoughts, at least insofar as they do 
not appear to be carefully structured extensions of an overall educational 
scheme. Munn points out that a "clinic cannot be healthy if it is operated as a 
mostly-severed limb of the faculty: to accomplish its educational goals it must 
have full support from faculty and it must be integrated into the law school 
curriculum." 173 The funding problems which clinical programs such as DLAS 
face will not be eliminated unless there is a clear and carefully structured 
educational focus to the program which integrates it into the rest of the law 
11° Boone, Jeeves, Macfarlane, supra note 123 at 175. 
11 1 Grossman, supra note 31at175. 
172 LaFrance, supra note 58 at 354. 
173 M.K. Munn, "Clinical Legal Education Through the Looking Glass" (1989) 12 Dal. 
L. J. 505 at 520. 
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school's educational goals. 174 Among other things, this would permit more 
students to participate in this kind of clinical experience, thus answering one of 
the stronger arguments against DLAS. 175 
CONCLUSION 
Before I undertook to research and write this paper, I had not made up my mind 
that clinical legal education was a necessary part of legal education. Although 
benefitting from my term at DLAS, and finding it much more interesting and 
challenging than traditional legal education, I was conscious of the expense 
involved and the limited number of students who directly benefitted. I started 
this paper feeling that unless there was a sufficiently strong argument to be made 
that clinical legal education such as that offered by DLAS was an essential part 
of a legal education, the financial pressures on the law school could justify 
eliminating the program. 
After finishing this paper my position is clear. What clinical legal education 
offers to the law student is a learning experience which is not available 
anywhere else. The question should not be whether it should exist at all within 
the law school curriculum; but rather, what can be done to further extend clinical 
opportunities to all students. To this end, not only should existing externship 
programs be extended, but also other clinical options should be explored and 
implemented. Further, the in-house clinical program, DLAS,. should be 
maintained and better integrated into the law school curriculum. There will 
always be changes required, but these should be based on raising the education 
of students to the best level possible, and not simply to a tolerable level. 
Educational institutions cannot shut themselves away from the social 
environment which surrounds them nor from the implications for society of what 
they are teaching students. To teach law in a societal vacuum is irresponsible, 
not only to the students but to the profession as a whole and to society. The 
constitutional entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 176 
which is primarily a legal instrument for social responsibility, shows the value 
that Canadians ascribe to the responsible interaction of law and human relations. 
Law schools have a responsibility to society to educate law students to be 
174 Befort, "Musings", supra note 106 at 627. 
175 Currently, DLAS counts for 13 credits, the equivalent of one full term. A maximum 
of approximately forty-five students can take part in the program in one year. If some 
students were able to participate for 3-5 credits, for example, through related courses such 
as Poverty Law, Landlord & Tenant, or Debtor & Creditor, the level of participation 
could increase. 
176 Part l of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c.11. 
244 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
socially responsible lawyers. I hope that this paper has demonstrated that the 
only way to ensure this type of education for students is to teach them the law in 
the context in which it operates. This is only possible through the use of the 
clinical methodology in clinical programs under the control of the law schools. 
While law schools have a responsibility to ensure the availability of clinical 
programs, clinicians have a responsibility to ensure that these programs remain 
educational experiences for the students. All the arguments which support the 
status of clinical legal education as an integral part of the law school curriculum 
are wholly dependent on the clinical experience providing a unique and essential 
educational opportunity for the student. If clinical programs offer anything less 
than that, they cannot justify their existence. 
Students also have a responsibility. They must demand that their law school 
offer them clinical education courses which are properly integrated into the 
curriculum. It is too easy to sit back and accept whatever is handed out, and it is 
also irresponsible. Students, by and large, enter law school with a social 
conscience; they should make sure that the law school graduates them with one. 
